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Abstract
We brie‡y survey several insights about value and revenue maximiza-
tion in multi-object auctions and apply them to the German (and Austrian)
UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure probelm that
caused …rms in Germany to pay almost Euro 20 billion for nothing.
1. The Main Aspects of License Auction Design
The recent European 3G license auctions focused the public attention and the
debate among practitioners and academic economists on several issues pertaining
to multi-object auctions. In fact, the most important issues in the design of license
auctions are placed at the intersection of industrial organization and mechanism
design (see the papers listed in Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000a) The point is that
license auctions or (other procedures such as beauty contests) do not only allocate
scarce goods, but also determine the nature of whole industries where entry is
otherwise almost impossible. Hence the outcome of any allocation procedure
in‡uences the future interaction among winning …rms, regulator (i.e., government)
and consumers. This obvious e¤ect should be taken in account for applications
of auction theory to license auctions (it is interesting to note that many …nancial
and telecom analysts explicitly took this e¤ect in consideration in their reports1)
Because of the market structure e¤ects, valuations (which depend on expecta-
tions about future market structure) are determined by the allocation procedure
itself, and are therefore endogenous. This creates another twist: potential acquir-
ers of licenses will anticipate the future scenarios as a function of the auction’s
¤C. Ewerhart thanks Mathias Meisel, portfolio manager at Zurich Invest, for many insightful
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1For example, a major investment bank, estimated per license values of Euro 14.75 Bn, 15.88
Bn and 17.6 Bn for a German symmetric market with 6, 5, or 4 …rms, respectively.
outcome, and they will condition their behavior before and during the auction on
those expectations. Failing to take into account these basic strategic motives at
the design stage can have harsh consequences for governments and/or consumers.
1.1. E¢ciency versus Value Maximization
Given the above observation, a maxim such as ”Put the licenses in the hands
of those who value them most” is nonsense in the context of European
3G auctions since the main goal of most license auction is economic e¢ciency.
But economic e¢ciency means that some weighted sum of …rms values and con-
sumer surplus should be maximized. Thus, equating total welfare (e¢ciency)
with …rms’ value maximization neglects the consumers. In fact, such an equation
probably means that one should create either national monopolies or even an
huge European one. Because of the well understood and documented dissipation
of rents in oligopoly, a potential monopolist may be willing to pay much more
for a (monopoly) license than several oligopolists together. Most observers would
rightly regard a recommendation to create a monopoly as ridiculous, since it is
obvious to them that the impact on consumer welfare will be disastrous. But,
the same observers seem to forget their Economics 101 when choosing between
designs that yield the one or the other oligopolistic market structures: maximiza-
tion of total welfare always means that, besides …rms’ valuations, the regulator
must be concerned about the e¤ects on consumers. Consumers’ interest should
have in fact a very high priority since this group does not participate at auctions,
and therefore information about their ”willingness to pay” is not revealed nor
processed during the bidding process (nor during beauty contests that purport to
care for consumers, but, in reality, tend to be determined by political interests,
nationalistic preferences, lobbying, explicit or implicit bribes, etc...). Hence the
only chance to incorporate consideration of consumers’ welfare is at the auction
design stage. Unfortunately, at this stage the regulators operate in the dark since
information about consumer welfare in various future scenarios cannot be easily
measured and anticipated.
One way (and probably the most e¤ective one) to take into account consumer
welfare is to encourage market entry. Although there is a myriad of IO models
with a myriad of results, as a rule of thumb it is probably wise to assume that
in reasonable ranges concerning the number of …rms, both consumers’ surplus
and overall e¢ciency increase with increased competition among …rms. This
means that market entry should be encouraged as long as it is economically viable
(obviously, the duplication of …xed costs and other factors speci…c to network
industries imply that new entry cannot be without limit). The most important
variable for controlling entry is the number of licenses2. For example, many
2There are other regulatory instruments, such as mandatory roaming, mandatory site-sharing
and payment for license fees by installments, that reduce …xed costs and/or …nancing costs for
entrants, and hence encourage entry.
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country which opted for beauty contests adhered to a simple formula that made
entry inevitable:
Number of 3G Licenses = Number of GSM Incumbents + 1
Also several countries that organized auctions (most notably the UK, which did
not even allow GSM operators to bid on the additional license) adopted the
above formula. The question is why should one choose a design where entry is
inevitable or very likely? Why is it not enough to choose a fair design that gives
all …rms equal chances to acquire licenses ? Because entry is encumbered by a
basic asymmetry among the …rms that already operate a GSM (2G) network in a
given country (incumbents) and those that do not (entrants). This asymmetry (as
re‡ected in the respective …xed costs needed to build a 3G system, …nancing costs,
customer base, recognition and brand names, marketing know-how, etc...) means
that incumbents will tend to have higher ”pure” valuations for licenses than new
entrants3. Besides the higher ”pure” valuations mentioned above, incumbents’
values will be even higher due to pre-emption motives : since per-…rm industry
pro…t in oligopoly decreases in the number of active …rms, incumbents will be
willing to pay large sums of money (even for a license that may be valueless to
them!) simply to avoid entry and cannibalization of their existing pro…ts. If
potential entrants understand the above logic4, they will either choose not to
participate at the auction, or they will try to form consortia with incumbents.
Both types of behavior have been amply observed in many of the UMTS auctions,
with adverse e¤ect on competitiveness (and hence ultimately on e¢ciency) and
on revenue.
After a regulatory scheme which encourages entry has been chosen, it is pos-
sible to concentrate on an auction format that tries to maximize the value for
…rms. But, as we will argue in the next section, there are many theoretical
factors (including the asymmetry among bidders) which make this task rather
di¢cult. Very roughly put, value maximizing multi-object auctions do not exist,
and second-best mechanisms are not known.
1.2. Value Maximization versus Revenue Maximization
Maximization of revenue has been a secondary goal in the UMTS license auctions.
Often this goal has been regarded as the main one by the media, the public, and
even by some academic commentators that tend to compare auction outcomes
3 In some cases, it is possible that entrants have higher valuations than incumbents. For
example, a particular country may be the “last piece in the puzzle” for an entrant that operates
globally. That …rm may be willing to pay more than a small incumbent with only local interests.
But such features are transient and hard to predict, and should not form the basis of auction
design.
4Klemperer (2000) points out that small perceived advantages (“toeholds”) can be trans-
formed in large advantages during the auction due to cautious behavior in order to avoid the
“winner’s curse”.
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on the basis of the associated revenue. It is no wonder that, as the sequence
of European auctions proceeded, several governments got very greedy, only to
be thoroughly disappointed at a later stage. Revenue maximization seems a
legitimate goal, particularly in the cases where it is believed that this form of
taxing …rms is more e¢cient (i.e., less distortionary) than other, more traditional
taxation schemes.
A widespread idea is that ”Value and revenue maximization go hand in hand”.
The intuition is as follows: if a large pie is created (by maximizing value for the
bidders), it will be possible to extract mor revenue; conversely, a large willingness
to pay re‡ected in high bids and revenue) means that a large value has been
created. Based on this belief, it seems possible to use revenue maximization as a
handy proxy for the more …ckle value maximization. This belief is mostly based
on powerful results from one-object auction theory. But nothing could be farther
from the truth in auctions (even single-object ones) where the valuations are en-
dogenous due to the external e¤ects caused by market structure considerations,
or in multi-object auctions with either exogenous or endogenous valuations: there
is no general relation between e¢ciency and revenue! Not even in a completely
standard multi-object model with no externalities whatsoever, no complementar-
ities, no nothing..., is it true that the auction that maximizes revenue is e¢cient
nor vice-versa. In particular, this means that multi-object auctions that
maximize revenue will not necessarily put the objects in the hands of
those that value them most.
Since this last argument is exceedingly simple, it is worth it mentioning here
(see also Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001b). Consider an auction for two objects A
and B, and two bidders, 1 and 2. For both agents, the valuations for the bundle
fA;Bg are given by the sum of the valuations for the individual objects, and
assume these to be as follows:
vA1 = 10; v
B
1 = 7
vA2 = 8; v
B
2 = 12
The value maximizing auction (which puts the objects in the hand of those
who value them most) is simply given by two separate second-price auctions, one
for each object. Then object A goes to bidder 1 for a price of 8; while object
B goes to bidder 2 for a price of 7: Total revenue is 15: But, consider now a
single second-price auction for the entire bundle fA; Bg: Then the bundle will be
acquired by bidder B; for a price of 17! Hence, revenue is higher in the bundle
auction, but object A is miss-allocated. Such a phenomenon occurs as soon as
bidders do not have single unit demand (e.g., in the German setting where blocks
of capacity were auctioned instead of licenses)
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2. The Theory of Value and Revenue Maximization in Auctions
Given the above widespread misconceptions, it is important to get an idea about
the main auction-theoretical results concerning revenue and value maximization.
This is surely not the place for an exhaustive survey, and we apologize to all
authors whose important results will not be included below. In particular, we
will consider only risk-neutral bidders.
Besides the obvious dependence on auction rules, the most important determi-
nants of theoretical auction performance are related to the economics of demand
in the underlying situation. Here are several crucial properties:
1. Bidder Symmetry. We say that bidders are (ex-ante) symmetric if their
utility functions have the same functional form.
2. Informational Externalities. We say that the economic situation displays
informational externalities if the valuation of one agent depends on infor-
mation available to another agent, i.e., the valuations contain common com-
ponents (For example consider two …rms that bid for an oil …eld. If one …rm
has an adjacent …eld, and has already conducted a geological survey, the
information contained in the survey a¤ects the valuations of both …rms)
3. Allocative Externalities. We say that the economic situation displays al-
locative externalities if the valuation of one bidder depends on the entire
allocation of physical goods to herself and other bidders. (For example,
in a license auction, the valuation of a monopolist incumbent may depend
on whether one or two licenses are auctioned. In the latter case entry is
possible, with an adverse e¤ect on the monopolist’s future pro…ts.)
4. Homogeneity/Heterogeneity of Goods. In an auction where several objects
are sold, we say that the objects are homogenous if they are indistinguish-
able from each other. Otherwise, objects are heterogenous.
5. Complementarities among Goods. In an auction where several objects are
sold, we say that the objects are (positive or negative) complements if the
value attached to a bundle is not equal to the sum of the values attached
to the individual objects in the bundle.
6. Unit Demand/Multi-unit Demand. We say that bidders have unit demand
if, in a multi-object auction, their demand is satiated after they acquire one
object. Otherwise, we say that bidders have multi-unit demand.
Generally speaking, the presence of asymmetries, heterogeneity, externalities
and complementarities all hinder value-maximization in auctions.
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2.1. Results for Single-Object Auctions
1. Classical auction formats (such as sealed-bid auctions, ascending, descend-
ing, all-pay, etc...) are both value-maximizing and revenue maximizing
(when augmented by simple instruments such as reserve prices or entry
fees) if bidders are symmetric, and if there are no allocative or informa-
tional externalities (Vickrey, 1961, Myerson, 1981, etc...).
2. The so called Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (CGV) mechanisms are value-maximizing
even if bidders are asymmetric and even if there are allocative externalities
(Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961).
3. The English ascending auction is value-maximizing even if there are asym-
metric bidders and informational externalities, as long as there are no al-
locative externalities (Maskin, 1992, Krishna, 2000, Izmalkov, 2001).
4. Modi…ed CGV mechanisms are value-maximizing even if there are asym-
metric bidders, and even if informational and allocative externalities are
present (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001a)
5. In general, allocative or informational externalities drive a wedge between
value-maximization and revenue (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996, 1999)
2.2. Multi-Object Auctions
1. CGV mechanisms are value-maximizing as long as there are no informa-
tional externalities (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961). In that
case, the CGV mechanisms are revenue maximizing among value maximiz-
ing mechanisms (Krishna and Perry, 1998). With additional assumptions
(e.g., either unit demand, or non-complementarities, or homogenous goods)
it is possible to implement the value maximizing outcome by an ascend-
ing, multi-object auction (Ausubel, 1997, Ausubel and Milgrom, 2001, De-
mange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1986, Gul and Stacchetti, 1999, Bikhchandani
and Ostroy, 2000a/b, Milgrom, 2000).
2. Modi…ed CGV mechanisms are value-maximizing even if bidders are asym-
metric and there are informational externalities as long as there are no
allocative externalities and no complementarities. (Ausubel, 1997, Cremer
and McLean, 1988, Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000, Jehiel and Moldovanu,
2001). With additional assumptions (e.g., homogenous goods) bidding
mechanism can be constructed that attain the value-maximizing outcome
(Perry and Reny, 1999).
3. Assume either: 1) Bidders are asymmetric, objects are heterogenous, there
are informational externalities and complementarities; or 2) Bidders are
asymmetric and there are both informational and allocative externalities.
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Then value-maximizing auctions do not exist (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001a).
Moreover, constrained (i.e., second-best) value maximizing auctions are not
yet known.
4. In general, the multi-object revenue maximizing auction is not known. The
maximization problem (which resembles the one for …nding constrained
value maximizing mechanisms - see point 3 above) involves a complex inte-
grability constraint (or, equivalently, a constraint which is represented by a
complex partial di¤erential equation) (Jehiel and Moldovanu and Stacchetti,
1999).
3. The German and Austrian Auctions
3.1. Design and Outcomes
The rather complex design (which was shared by both countries) involved two
consecutive auctions.5 The …rst auction allocated licenses together with so called
”duplex” or ”paired” spectrum frequencies. The second auction allocated paired
spectrum that has not been sold at the …rst auction, together with additional
”unpaired” spectrum. Both auctions were of the ”simultaneous multiple-round
ascending” type. We focus below on the …rst, main auction.
Bidders did not directly submit bids for licenses. Instead, the auctioned ob-
jects were 12 abstract blocks of paired spectrum.
A bidder obtained a license only if he acquired at least two blocks, but a
bidder was allowed to acquire (at most) three blocks. The number of licensed
…rms was therefore variable (between 0 and 6). If all blocks get sold, then there
were bound to be at least 4 licenses (this equaled the number of GSM incumbents
in both Germany and Austria).
Each block had a reserve price of DM 100 Million in Germany and Euro 50
Million in Austria. At each round a bidder had to bid on at least two blocks.
Strangely enough, although the blocks were abstract and identical, bids carried
name tags6! Bidding on only two blocks at round t precluded bidding on three
blocks at all rounds t0 > t:
A block could have remained unsold either because there were no bids for
that block above the reserve price, or because the bidder who submitted the last
highest bid on that particular block ultimately failed to acquire two blocks , in
which case he was not required to make a payment.
In Germany there were 7 bidders (including 4 GSM incumbents), after 6 other
quali…ed bidders ultimately withdrew from the auction. The auction lasted for 3
5For details on the design, see the o¢cial document by the RegTP (2000).
6For example, the Italian design, which auctioned 5 identical licenses required from bidders
just a bid (without speci…cation to which license it applied).
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weeks and 173 rounds of bidding, and resulted in 6 licenses being awarded (4 of
them to the existing GSM operators). The licensed …rms were the 4 incumbents
and two new entrants (one of them already operating as service provider). Each
licensed …rm acquired 2 blocks of paired spectrum, paying approximately Euro
8.4 Bn (or Euro 4.2 Bn per block). The most interesting thing occurred after one
of the potential entrants, Debitel, left the auction after 125 rounds and after the
price level reached Euro 2.5 Bn per block. Since 6 …rms were left bidding for a
maximum of 6 licenses, the auction could have stopped immediately. Instead, the
remaining …rms (and in particular the two large incumbents) continued bidding
in order to acquire more capacity. But no other …rm was willing to quit, and
bidding stopped in round 173. Compared to round 125, there was no change in
the physical allocation, but …rms where, collectively, Euro 20 Bn poorer!7
In Austria there were exactly 6 bidders (4 of them GSM incumbents) for a
maximum of 6 licenses. Hence, in principle, the license auction could have ended
immediately, at the reserve price (Euro 100 mil. per license). Nevertheless, the
auction continued for another 16 rounds, before stopping with...6 licensed …rms
(4 of them to the existing GSM operators), each paying on average about Euro
118 mil. per license. Hence, about Euro 108 mil. have been again spent for
nothing.
3.2. Bene…ts and Disadvantages of the German and Austrian Design
A main perceived advantage of the German auction was its ‡exibility. It has
been argued that ex-ante carving of spectrum in …xed chunks of capacity can-
not be e¢cient, since the regulator is less informed about the precise operational
needs of the involved …rms. On the same vein, since the regulator does not really
know how many …rms are e¢cient, why not let …rms themselves determine the
number of licenses in a competitive bidding process? These arguments are not
entirely correct, since thgey confuse value maximization (for the involved …rms)
with e¢ciency, thus neglecting consumers. From the point of view of value max-
imization, a design which allows for a variable number of small and large licenses
seems more desirable than those designs where the number of licenses and their
capacity where …xed ex-ante. While this argument is correct, its implementation
in the German and Austrian design mixed ‡exibility in that dimension with ‡ex-
ibility concerning the number of …rms. Since the overall industry pro…ts fall in
the number of …rms, while consumer surplus probably increases, it is obvious that
letting the …rms themselves decide how many of them will be able to operate in
the market is very problematic form the point of view of consumers, and hence
for overall e¢ciency.
Consider a hypothetical story where the regulator proposes the following reg-
ulatory scheme to existing …rms in the market: each …rm has to pay a hefty fee to
7The outcome was so unfortunate that Deutsche Telekom became apologetic after the auction.
See Financial Times (2000).
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the state; depending on the paid fees, the regulator allows more or less (possibly
none) new …rms in the market, with higher fees meaning less …rms. Sounds ridicu-
lous ? But this was, roughly speaking, how the German and Austrian designs
operated, and this feature has been highly praised by some observers.
Despite the above crucial caveat, it is instructive to judge the design in terms
of its ability to achieve value and/or revenue maximization in light of the prop-
erties listed in the previous Section:
1. By introducing bidding on 1,2, or 3 blocks rather than directly on licenses,
the auction arti…cially created a situation with multi-unit demand, and
therefore o¤ered scope for demand reduction gaming e¤ects. While such
e¤ects usually lead to ine¢ciencies, here it may, in fact, have had some
positive e¤ect since they can partly combat the opposite demand increasing
e¤ect due to allocative externalities (see point 3 below)
2. It is obvious that complementarities existed among blocks. The …rst block
was worth nothing, the second a lot, and the third had a positive value.
3. By completely endogenising the …rms’ valuations (since number of …rms
and capacities were endogenous) the auction focused most of the strategic
behavior on the allocative externalities, and created an arti…cial demand-
increasing e¤ect. For example, the intrinsic value of a third block of capacity
was greatly augmented in feasible scenarios where acquiring such a block
leads to less …rms in the market. It is impossible to say with certainty
whether demand reduction was stronger than arti…cial demand increase
or vice versa since the strengths of these e¤ects depends on the level of
prices. Obviously, demand increase played the major role following Debitel’s
quitting, and demand reduction …nally took place when prices reached very
high levels.
4. In auctions with allocative externalities, a revenue-maximizing seller can
extract revenue by ”threats” to sell exactly to those agents that create
negative externalities on others (Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti 1996,
1999). I am happy to say that this argument was very well understood
by the auction designers (see the demand increase e¤ect at the previous
point). By allowing 4 to 6 …rms, such a threat to sell to newcomers was in
e¤ect operative, and, in principle, avoidable for a high enough price. Some
commentators argued that the German design was therefore much better
geared towards revenue maximization. If endogenous entry decisions are
neglected, this argument is correct.
5. Last, but not least, the multi-unit-demand and complementarity features
created a massive exposure and regret problem for the involved …rms (since
exclusive combinatorial bids on entire packages were not allowed). It is
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therefore no wonder that Euro 20 billion were spend on nothing in the Ger-
man auction, and that …rms quickly learned to avoid this catastrophe (by
relatively fast demand reduction) in the Austrian auction. Generally speak-
ing, auctions that create exposure and regret phenomena are not attractive
for bidders which may rationally decide to avoid bidding altogether.
In the next section we want to analytically focus on this exposure problem,
since it was somewhat neglected in the debate so far.
4. The Exposure Problem in the German Design
4.1. Flexibility vs. Risk
The presence of exposure risks in multi-unit license auctions has been identi…ed
before, e.g., by Cramton (1997) in the context of the FCC spectrum auctions8.
Cramton uses a simple example in order to show that, with increasing marginal
valuations for several objects, bidders risk getting stuck with less of what they
attempted to acquire. While the basic idea of the subsequent analysis is in the
same spirit, we do not presuppose increasing marginal valuations. Indeed, our
discussion shows that the exposure problem in the German design was a con-
sequence of the fact that the ‡exible German design has been combined with a
de-facto uniform-price auction. Speci…cally, when a dominant incumbent tries to
push the weakest entrant out of the market, he may be unsuccessful and su¤er
from regret. The attempt to create a more concentrated market structure may
drive prices up for all acquired frequency blocks without changing the allocation.
This is the basic idea underlying Ewerhart and Moldovanu’s (2001) analysis.
The model used in this paper combines elements of the complete information
setting of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000b) with existing models of uniform-price
auctions, as analyzed by Noussair (1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn
(1998).
4.2. A Stylized Model
The model developed below will abstract from a number of facts that were present
in the actual situation. Firstly, we will focus on the …rst stage of the German
design. The bidders’ valuations in the subsequent analysis should therefore be
interpreted as valuations that the …rms attribute to speci…c outcomes of the …rst
stage. We will discuss later why the second stage does not a¤ect our arguments.
We will also abstract from the fact that the German license auction must be prop-
erly considered as a part of a more global process, in which international telecom
…rms have fought about the position in the European market. E.g., it has been
suggested by van Damme (2001) that the high prices in Germany resulted from a
8See also and Ausubel and Cramton (1998).
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struggle mainly between KPN, represented by E-Plus, and Telefonica, represented
by Group 3G. Moreover, while …nancial externalities and credit constraints might
have played a signi…cant role, we will also abstract from these complications.
The formal analysis starts with a setting in which 12 frequency blocks are sold
to i = 1; :::; n bidders. Bidder i has valuations vim(k) for a m-block license in a
k-player market, where m 2 f2; 3g and k 2 f4; 5; 6g.9 The auction is open and
ascending and most easily viewed as a clock auction. Each bidder may bid for
two or three blocks, and an activity rule speci…es that demand may not increase
during the auction.
The …nal price is the lowest price p¤ at which aggregate demand drops to 12
or even lower. If aggregate demand drops to precisely 12, then the corresponding
highest bids are satis…ed. Otherwise a randomizing tie-breaking rule is applied,
whose speci…cation is of minor importance in the sequel. Essentially, each bidder
submits a bid bi = (bi3; bi2), where bi3 is the price level at which i’s demand is
reduced from three to two units, and bi2 is the price level where bidder i drops
out completely.
While the above speci…cation is of the ”sealed bid type”, our informational
assumptions mean that bidders do not learn new information during the auction.
4.3. Assumptions
Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2001) make a number of assumptions that focus the
analysis on the case that had been observed. Firstly, there are only n = 6
bidders (i.e., the analysis focusses on the main stage of interest which starts
when the number of bidders precisely equals the maximal number of licenses and
the auction could have been immediately stopped). Bidders are ordered according
to their valuations, with bidder 1, the dominant incumbent, having the highest
valuations. Thus, we require that vim(k) is decreasing in i. Moreover, we assume
that valuations vim(k) are increasing in the number of blocks m, and decreasing
in the number of players in the market k.
The weakest bidder’s (i.e., the weakest entrant’s) valuation for a small two-
block license is denoted by v := v62(6). We assume that v is uncertain ex-ante,
and is distributed on an interval [v; v] such that
v
2
<
v13(5)
3
<
v
2
. (4.1)
This assumption generates an uncertainty about whether the per-block valuation
of the dominant incumbent for a large license is higher or lower than the per-block
valuation of the weakest entrant for a small license. - Figure 1
here -Finally, it is assumed that the value of the third block is not too large for
9 In the actual setting, the second stage opened the theoretical possibility to obtain even 4
blocks. As mentioned before, for simplicity, we will abstract here from the second stage.
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bidders 2 to 6, i.e., that
v23(4)
3
<
v
2
. (4.2)
Figure 1 illustrates the per-block valuations in the stylized model of the UMTS
auction. On the left-hand side, one sees the per-block valuation of the weakest
bidder 6 for a large license in a concentrated market, i.e., in a market with 5
players. Going to the right, we have the corresponding valuations for bidders 5
to 1. Next, one has the uncertain valuation for the weakest entrant v62(6)=2; that
may vary between v=2 and v=2. Still further to the right we depicted the per-unit
valuations of the remaining bidders 5 to 1 for a small license in a less concentrated
market.
4.4. Equilibrium
Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2001) show that the following bidding behavior con-
stitutes an equilibrium in the stylized UMTS auction: With the exception of the
strongest incumbent bid, each bidder i bids his true per-block valuations in the
sense that they bid for three units up to vi3(5)=3; and for two units up to vi2(6)=2.
Bidder 1, in contrast, bids only up to some price level ¯¤ for three units. Equilib-
rium behavior is illustrated in Figure 1. When prices increase, all six bidders …rst
reduce their demand from three to two, one by one, and starting with the weakest
bidders. It can be shown that, depending on the parameters of the model, each
of the two alternative equilibria may occur:
1. (“accommodate”) In this case ¯¤ = v23(5)=3; so that bidder 1 reduces his
demand for the third unit in accordance with the second strongest bidder
2, and the auction ends at a price p0 = v23(5)=3 with a six-player market.
2. (“…ght”) In this case bidder 1 keeps up demand for three units up to a
level of ¯¤ 2 [v=2; v13(5)=3] and tries to push the weakest entrant out of
the market. In that equilibrium two things may happen. If ¯¤ > v=2, the
dominant incumbent wins the battle, and the auction ends with a price of
v=2, allocating a large license to the dominant incumbent, and small licenses
to bidders 2 to 5. Otherwise, the entrant wins the battle, and a six-player
market results with a …nal per-block price of ¯¤. The optimal bid ¯¤ for
the incumbent maximizes the expected pro…t function
U1(¯) =
Z 2¯
v
fv13(5) ¡ 3v2 gdF (v) +
Z v
2¯
fv12(6) ¡ 2¯gdF (v); (4.3)
where F (v) is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to the
distribution of v. Hence, ¯¤ is implicitly given by
¯¤ + 1 ¡ F (2¯
¤)
F 0(2¯¤) = v
1
3(5) ¡ v12(6). (4.4)
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Formula 4.4 shows that the dominant incumbent lowers his bid as a conse-
quence of the exposure.
Both equilibria are stable with respect to the introduction of a second stage, under
some additional assumptions. Speci…cally, when we assume that the marginal
valuation of a fourth block is lower than the marginal valuation of a third block,
then the second stage will always end with giving any remaining block to bidder
2. When the additional value that bidder 2 has from obtaining a third block
in the second stage is taken into account in the …rst stage, this will increase
the valuation of bidder 2 for a small license in a concentrated market with …ve
players, but leave the valuations of both bidders 1 and 2 for a large license in a
concentrated market una¤ected. But then it is immediate from Figure 1 that the
second stage does not a¤ect equilibrium behavior.10
4.5. Regret
The second equilibrium illustrates the exposure problem. Speci…cally, when the
incumbent tries to push the entrant out of the market, but is ultimately unsuc-
cessful, he increases the prices for the two blocks he could acquire for sure, so that
regret may occur. Technically, this means that the outcome does not constitute
an ex-post equilibrium11. The regret can be made explicit by considering the
di¤erence in expected utility between …ghting and accommodating:
¢U1 = pr(
v
2
< ¯)
n
v13(5) ¡ v12(6) ¡ p0 ¡ 3¢w
o
(4.5)
+ pr(
v
2
¸ ¯)
n
¡2¢l
o
;
where
¢w = E[
v
2
jv
2
< ¯] ¡ p0 (4.6)
¢l = ¯ ¡ p0 (4.7)
is the expected increment in the price per block in cases where the incumbent
wins and loses the battle, respectively.
The above expression captures the regret e¤ect as follows: In case that the
incumbent wins, he earns an incremental utility that corresponds to the di¤erence
between his valuation of a large license in a concentrated market and his valuation
of a small license in a less concentrated market. But he also has to pay the
accommodating price p0 for the additional block, and, for each of the three blocks,
10 In contrast, the second stage is strategically relevant in Wolfstetter (2001), who assumes
that two dominant incumbents have the potential to push out an incumbent.
11 In an ex-post equilibrium, agents do not wish to change their actions even after learning
the private information held by their competitors. This concept is stronger that Bayes-Nash
equlibrium, but weaker than dominant strategy equilibrium.
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the expected price increment conditional on his winning the battle. In the other
case, i.e., when the incumbent loses the battle, he realizes a loss on each of the two
remaining frequency blocks, which corresponds to the expected price increment
conditional on his losing the battle. This second expression captures the regret
outcome because ¢l is the per-block price increment that is spuriously paid when
the battle is lost, and the outcome is the same as the one occurring at the lower
price level.
5. Conclusion
This survey has reviewed a number of insights about value and revenue max-
imization objectives in multi-unit auctions. In the light of these insights, we
have discussed several advantages and potential problems of the German UMTS
auction. That design allowed a ‡exible allocation of capacity which is an ad-
vantage vis-à-vis less ‡exible designs. But, under incomplete information, and
in the presence of externalities stemming from market structure considerations,
this ‡exibility has caused a signi…cant exposure for bidders, with the potential
of ine¢cient non-participation and of shareholder value destruction. Because the
‡exible design allows incumbents to …ght entrants, the prices paid in the ‡exi-
ble design can be strictly higher than those resulting from a less ‡exible design
yielding the same outcome. Moreover, the ‡exible design included the risk of a
concentrated market structure, with adverse e¤ects on consumers. For this rea-
son, and because the huge exposure problem a¤ected the …nancial stability of
the telecommunications industry, we question the e¢ciency gains obtained with
a ‡exible design.
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Figure 1 : Equilibrium bids in the stylized UMTS auction
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